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Season
2003/04 Part 3
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Back
from the brink
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Part 1 A season from Hell - Part
2 What went wrong? - Part 4 End of an era
- Results and table As Leeds' playing form dipped badly during the autumn of 2003, the club's
financial fortunes also hit crisis point. The financial gamble of a headlong
dash for growth and the golden egg of Champions' League rewards had been
unwise in the extreme - the chickens were coming home to roost. Incoming chairman Professor John McKenzie hinted at the magnitude
of the challenge shortly after taking over the Elland Road hot
seat: 'There's been irresponsibility and indulgent spending. This is unacceptable
at any time, but especially at a time when the club was losing vast amounts
of money. It's like an oil tanker that was heading straight for the rocks
and the shareholders have put someone else on board to turn it around.
The trouble with oil tankers is they're two miles long and they don't
turn around in two minutes. But we will get back on a winning trail. I
would ask the supporters to get behind us and be patient while we sort
it out.' The bungled sale of Harry Kewell and the aborted departure of
Paul Robinson in the summer of 2003 were signs of desperation,
but McKenzie had developed a rescue plan. A £10m rights issue
was planned for October to generate some much-needed cash to tide
the club over until stringent cost reduction measures began to
bite. The plans were quietly dropped as it became evident that the club's plight
was worse than had been imagined and the likelihood of getting existing
shareholders to dig deep in their pockets seemed slim indeed. McKenzie and finance director Neil Robson were feverishly negotiating
with the club's major creditors to agree a rescheduling of the massive
debt, and hinted that unless an arrangement could be agreed, the club
might slide into administration. At the end of October, the stakes were raised considerably as
the club announced its financial results. A pre-tax loss of £49.5m
was a new record for a Premiership club, while the debt remained
stubbornly around the £80m mark. McKenzie's positive spin on the
matter was that the loss before player trading was 'only' £25.4m
and that the club expected to be operating at a breakeven level
within twelve months as costs came under control. Tucked away in the accompanying notes were some paragraphs detailing
the company's ability to continue as a going concern: 'In August 2003, the group commenced negotiations with its principal
financial creditors designed to defer capital payments on its principal
lending facilities and to permit new moneys to be introduced to the group.
Discussions … have progressed well and the group is currently in the advanced
stages of detailed and complex negotiations with these financial creditors
and potential new financiers. These negotiations are expected to represent
the first stage in the overall restructuring and refinancing of the group.
Final negotiations … are in progress and the directors anticipate that
they will be concluded shortly. Given the nature of these negotiations,
there is uncertainty about their final outcome. 'Subsequent to the conclusion of these legal agreements, the group will
enter into further negotiations with its financial creditors and seek
to raise external funds from potential new financiers to establish a capital
structure which will provide the flexibility to manage any significant
under-performance of the business without having to undertake a fundamental
restructuring of the group. This would include the consequences of the
football team failing to maintain FA Premier League status. Again, given
the nature of these negotiations and any fund raising, there is uncertainty
about their final outcome. However, the directors expect that they will
be concluded favourably and will provide them with the flexibility to
manage the business over the long term and will provide the group with
the necessary working capital through until at least 31 October 2004. 'Consequently, the directors continue to believe that the going concern
basis is appropriate in the preparation of these accounts.' On a more positive note, McKenzie was able to announce the appointment
of former Chelsea supremo Trevor Birch as chief executive of Leeds United. Birch had built himself a sound reputation as a deal maker and negotiator
after retiring from professional football at just 23 following spells
with Liverpool, Shrewsbury and Chester, where he replaced Ian Rush. He
gave up what could have been a glittering career to become a chartered
accountant, going to Liverpool Polytechnic before being taken on by Ernst
& Young. There he developed as a respected insolvency practitioner, remaining
with the firm for 18 years before joining Chelsea in April 2002 as chief
executive. Birch was instrumental in introducing Russian billionaire Roman
Abramovich to Chelsea and played a key role in signing players
during the summer, including Juan Sebastian Veron, Damien Duff
and Adrian Mutu. McKenzie was in no doubt as to Birch's quality: 'He brings an enormous number of things to Leeds United. He brings experience,
he has worked on both sides of the fence as an accountant and as a director
of a major football club who have had similar problems to Leeds. He has
played football, so he's experienced on the field and his knowledge of
the game is extremely high. He, together with my finance director Neil
Robson, will be a very significant part of the new team which I said I
would set up to manage Leeds United. 'We are not asking him to come in to find us a white knight. Obviously
it would be useful if we find somebody who is prepared to inject significant
amounts of capital, but that's not his primary aim - his primary aim is
to run the business.' Birch's appointment was well received by the financial institutions,
with the city well aware of his excellent track record. Henk Potts from
Barclays Brokers: 'Before the billionaire showed up at Chelsea they were
in financial difficulty as well. He is a good deal maker, he can talk
to financial institutions and does have a very strong track record. They
are bringing in a very heavy hitter who knows how to deal with these types
of situations. The management restructuring is certainly seen as a positive
by the city, they will like his appointment.' Birch was recruited specifically to handle debt-restructuring
negotiations with creditors. It was hoped that this, coupled with
a cash injection of £4.4m from deputy chairman Allan Leighton
and the rights issue, would allow the club to go forward on a
sounder financial footing. However, the negotiations ran into difficulty and the club were
forced to make a Stock Exchange announcement at the end of November. 'As announced on 28 October, the directors have been negotiating the
first phase of a complex debt restructuring of the Group's finances with
its principal finance creditors to provide the Group 'Unfortunately, after a long period of constructive discussions, negotiations
have failed to reach a satisfactory conclusion in time to issue a circular
and obtain shareholder approval. As a result, it has been decided not
to go ahead with the planned subscription for shares. 'Nevertheless, the Company continues to be in constructive discussions
with its principal finance creditors and proposed investors with a view
to providing the Group with additional working capital and to give it
time to implement a more permanent restructuring plan. In addition, Allan
Leighton has already confirmed that his funds remain available for investment
in the Group. 'The directors are continuing to take steps to manage cash flows … and
remain of the view that, if all of these negotiations are concluded successfully,
they will provide adequate funding for at least three months in which
to conclude arrangements designed to achieve a more permanent refinancing
of the Group. But, if the negotiations referred to above are unsuccessful,
the directors may be forced to seek the protection of an administration
order.' A week later, Professor McKenzie announced that the club had managed
to agree a standstill arrangement with its creditors, staving off the
imminent threat of becoming the first Premiership club to go into administration: 'Leeds United plc announces that it has signed a formal standstill agreement
… for the period until 19 January 2004 to provide the Group with sufficient
working capital … to allow it time to seek to identify parties who would
be prepared to make a substantial investment in … the business as part
of an overall financial and balance sheet restructuring.' As part of the deal, the bondholders allowed a 'locked up' cash holding
of £4.1m to be temporarily released to support the club's immediate cash
flow needs. Further to this, REFF/Gerling agreed to defer £1.7m of capital
and interest repayments due and the plc's bankers, HSBC, provided a new
term loan facility. All of this meant that Birch and McKenzie had around six weeks to try
and negotiate a sale of the club. Dr Bill Gerard, of Leeds University Business School, said the announcement
provided hope for the fans: 'The bottom line is Leeds have payments coming up in the next few weeks
which they don't have cash for and the only way they could have met them
was to sell players or go into administration. This means the creditors
are cutting them some slack and the standstill agreement means they will
not ask for any payments before 19 January. The immediate threat of administration
has receded and the club is not going to default in the next five to six
weeks and that means the club does not have to sell players when the transfer
window reopens. 'The positive element in this is that if the creditors - who stand to
lose £90million - have been prepared to wait until 19 January they must
have had a reasonable belief that a credible consortium was coming in.
The stepping down of Allan Leighton is very, very significant. The only
reason he has stepped down from the board is to put together a rescue
package. Leeds United will definitely not be out of business at the end
of the season and by February/March time Leeds United plc will have changed
into a new company with new owners.' In the end, it wasn't quite as simple as that, and there was a seemingly
endless series of deadlines set for completion of negotiations, underlining
the peril of the situation. On 12 January, a week before the first deadline
passed, Leeds claimed they were in constructive discussions with a number
of parties about asset sales or injection of funds. On 19 January, the
club were given a one-week extension to find funding. On 26 January they
were given a further four days to find a solution. That deadline was then
pushed back again, first to 6 February and then 13 February, before a
further fortnight's reprieve was granted. At 14.00 GMT on 27 February
shares in the club were suspended with the standstill agreement scrapped,
although creditors indicated they were still supportive of the club in
their quest for a sale. It seemed that the saga would go on forever. Trevor Birch was desperately seeking to secure enough savings and cash
(£5m was the popular estimate of the required sum) to keep the club going
while it could arrange a solution. There was an ill-tempered spat with the players who initially refused
to agree to a temporary 20% deferral of their wages, arguing instead that
the club should sell one of them (rumoured to be Alan Smith or Mark Viduka)
during the January transfer window. The fans reacted bitterly to the players'
intransigence, and eventually Birch secured his deferral. He also negotiated a deferral of severance payments owed to previous
managers David O'Leary, Terry Venables and Peter Reid. A £1m instalment due on the sale of Robbie Fowler was gratefully clawed
out of Manchester City after the striker's 30th game for his new club.
City's neighbours, United coughed up £1.5m as a final payment on the big
money purchase of Rio Ferdinand, while Birch was also pursuing Professor
McKenzie, now resigned form the board, for the repayment of £200,000 in
consultancy fees. Somehow, Birch managed to scrimp and save sufficient cash to tide Leeds
over those dreadful weeks when it seemed that the club might actually
go broke. That he should also stand firm during the transfer window and
resist a cut-price offer from Tottenham for Paul Robinson and James Milner
was testimony to the skills of a truly remarkable man, one who almost
single-handedly steered an ailing club through treacherous seas. Birch could finally breathe a sigh of satisfaction and relief when a
financial deal formalising the sale of Leeds United was completed on Friday,
19 March, 2004, after months of protracted negotiation. The identity of
the men behind the successful Yorkshire-based consortium had been kept
a closely guarded secret throughout the period, while newspaper gossip
had speculated about the intentions of alternative suitors with higher
profiles. The first, and most romantic, notion was that a member of Bahrain's royal
family would bring a £60m investment to the club. Sheikh Abdul Rahman
bin Mubarak al-Khalifa, chairman of Bahraini side Al-Najma, was a businessman
who had been a lifelong fan of the club. He hinted strongly that he had
the financial backing of a consortium from the Middle East, saying, 'I
have been doing my best to put a bid together. There are signs of hope.
The more talks I have, the more optimistic I become about a solution.'
He also spoke of his 'passionate desire to re-awaken a sleeping giant.
I fell in love with the club when I was 11 years old when Leeds played
Chelsea in the 1970 FA Cup final. It was fated that I should love the
club. Whether that fate will determine that I can save them 30 years later,
I don't know. Leeds mean everything to me, I was born to support them.
Those who are closest to me, my friends and my family, know what Leeds
United mean to me.' On two occasions, the Sheikh's consortium claimed they were ready to
put an offer on the table, but no proof was forthcoming of their financial
resources, and the United board dismissed their intentions as being without
foundation. John McKenzie resigned from the board to try and bring forward a package
of support from the Far East, with one of China's richest men rumoured
to be a backer. Xu Ming, 32, the president of Shide, a petrochemicals
and housing materials group and owner of Dalian Shide, a Chinese first
division club, spoke of wanting a joint venture with a leading European
club. There was no evidence that the interest was ever more than conjecture. Michael Ezra, a 30-year-old Ugandan property tycoon, claimed he had £90m
of funding available but that a takeover was stymied by his proposals
for an all-foreign board. Ezra was reportedly given a guided tour of Leeds'
Thorp Arch training ground but said: 'The six-man board that I had presented
doesn't have any Britons and Leeds don't find that acceptable. They also
feel that my board lacks the technical expertise to bolster the club,
but money is no longer the issue, that has been sorted. Leeds know that
I have £60m, while my board would also spend an extra £30m to strengthen
the team.' Ezra faded out of the picture almost as quickly as he had appeared. Leeds United's former deputy chairman, Allan Leighton, resigned in order
to put together a rescue package and his ARM Holdings Group were ready
to inject £4.4m into the club as part of a refinancing deal. He was understood
to have put forward a £15m package that was rejected out of hand by the
club's directors, although there were continual hints that he was waiting
in the wings to buy out the club if it should go into administration. A local consortium, fronted by ex-Huddersfield Town chairman Terry Fisher,
expressed a serious interest in rescuing the club. There were positive
noises and, with former United favourite Trevor Cherry involved, fans
looked favourably on their bid. But weeks of hope were ended when the
consortium officially withdrew their interest after inspecting the club's
books. However, in the end a rescue deal was done. Another consortium, The full facts and details of the deal might never be known, but the
substance was that the overall debt of the club, which was understood
to be in excess of £100m, was slashed to the more manageable figure of
just over £20m. Gerling Insurance, the credit insurers of player-leasing
agents REFF, who were owed £21.3m, cut their losses and agreed a substantially
lower one-off payment. The bondholders, M&G, Teachers and MetLife, agreed
to take a lump sum to settle a liability of £60m, although they would
receive further payments at a future date if Leeds United managed to recapture
past glories. The other major creditors - the Inland Revenue and Customs
& Excise, who between them were owed in the region of £10m - would be
paid off over an extended period along with other minor debtors including
former managers. The men behind Adulant Force had put up £5m of their own money to provide
much needed working capital, with further personal guarantees of £5, and
borrowed another £15m from former Watford chairman Jack Petchey. Petchey's
money was used to clear the club's debts. For weeks lawyers for the bondholders
and Gerling argued over the division of the £15 million. The bondholders
won in the end, getting 20p in the £1 (£12m), with Gerling settling for
10p (£2.13m). As impressive as the bargain was, however, Elland Road fans remained
uneasy for a number of reasons. The first was the Petchey loan, and the secrecy that surrounded it. A spokesman for Petchey (Holdings) Ltd said: 'It is company policy not
to comment to the media.' Watford fans did not recall Petchey with affection
as, when he left the club in 1994, he called in £3.5m of loans. That was
not Petchey's first foray into football, and he also served on West Ham's
board from 1979, leaving before his involvement in Watford. Petchey, 78,
was a classic corporate-raider, using his Trefick and Richmount offshore
investment vehicles to invest heavily in the equity of companies with
undervalued property assets. He could then use his stake as a platform
for a subsequent takeover bid or to influence outside interest. Having left school at 14 to become an office boy in a firm of legal stationers,
Petchey received a £39 demob payment after the second world war, which
he invested in a taxi business, making a substantial return on a sale
of the firm's real estate. It was in the car trade in the 1960s that Petchey's
first brush with controversy occurred, when the church protested at his
use of scantily clad models in advertisements. Such experiences persuaded
Petchey to keep a low profile and he never gave interviews or made public
pronouncements. It was understood that the £15m was secured against the Elland Road ground
and that the debt should be repaid within twelve months, otherwise Petchey
would assume control of the property, causing concern that the club might
be evicted. The bigger issue in the eyes of the fans, however, was the involvement
in the deal of former Bradford City chairman, Geoffrey Richmond. David Conn in The Independent: 'At Bradford, whom he left in administration
in August 2002 with debts of £36m, the club had the previous year sold
a 25-year season ticket at a major discount. When Bradford went into administration,
the nearly 1,000 fans who bought them were merely unsecured creditors. 'Bradford, taken out of administration by Richmond's former co-investors,
the Rhodes family, did honour the long-term tickets, but this only means
that a proportion of their most loyal fans will be coming in free for
the next 22 years. 'Having explicitly denied earlier this year that he was involved with
any consortium, Richmond admitted more recently that he was acting as
an advisor. In fact, he told me: "Ninety-nine per cent of the deal
was down to me." 'It is the tail end of that CV which has attracted intense hostility
from Leeds fans, including the Supporters' Trust, to Richmond's involvement
at Leeds. Richmond, who said he now wanted to rectify the mistakes he
made, recounted that before his self-confessed "six weeks of madness"
in summer 2000, signing players including Benito Carbone on crazy wages
which ultimately forced the club into administration, he had been conspicuously
successful, first steadying Scarborough, then from 1994 taking Bradford
to the Premiership and rebuilding the club and its grounds. 'However, when Bradford were relegated in 2001, everything, from catering
equipment to players, was on hire purchase or sold and leased back. The
club went into administration owing £7.4m to REFF, £6.7m to Lombard Finance,
£4.6m to the HSBC Bank, and laden with unsustainable players' contracts.
Just one and two years earlier, he and his son David had shared with David
Rhodes and his son Julian £8.125m in dividends, and Geoffrey Richmond
was also paid a £250,000 consultancy fee in October 2001. 'Yet when money was then needed to keep the club alive, Richmond put
nothing in. David Rhodes paid £400,000 to fund it through administration,
and the Rhodes family have hardly stopped shovelling money in since. Gordon
Gibb, the owner of the Flamingoland zoo and theme park, arrived, on Richmond's
introduction, to invest £1.875m, and Richmond left, financially intact. 'Richmond told me he had wanted to stay, and believed he had an agreement
to split ownership of the club in thirds with the Rhodeses and Gibb, but
instead the Rhodeses decided they did not want him. Julian Rhodes told
me they had indeed discussed various ideas, but had no concrete agreement:
"In the end we told Geoffrey if he was not prepared to put money
in, as we were doing, he could have no part in owning the club in the
future." 'In May last year, Richmond's reason for being "unable" to
do so was revealed; the Inland Revenue won a High Court case against him
for £2.3m tax owed from when he had sold his Ronson lighters business
for £10m nine years before. Richmond had not paid capital gains tax, but
instead sought to "roll it over" into another venture. The judge,
Mr Justice Etherton, ruled that it was not a valid new business: "Its
only purpose was tax mitigation." 'Deciding that the £2.3m tax did have to be paid, the judge said Richmond
and his former co-director, Martin Jones, "failed to satisfy the
court that they acted in all respects honestly and reasonably." Richmond
told me the tax bill is still not paid; he is hoping to settle it within
a few weeks. 'His problems with the Inland Revenue, he said, were why he could not
provide money to save Bradford, and is not a shareholder with the consortium
at Leeds. He said he would, however, like to become the chief executive
'Richmond stressed that his football record overall was good: "I
had 14 tremendous years with two clubs I took over in severe financial
trouble. I made a horrendous mistake in the summer of 2000, for which
I took responsibility. I have learned from that and will not be doing
it again." 'Leeds, meanwhile, stagger into the future, advised by Richmond from
his new office at Elland Road. He said that in three years the club will
be healthy and the investors sitting on a fortune. Others who have looked
believe Leeds cannot pay their way with borrowed money and will yet collapse.
For Richmond, looking to rehabilitate his reputation, this is a high stakes
game, with the world watching.' The Leeds fans were understandably cautious about Richmond's involvement
with Adulant Force, particularly as he had originally denied that he had
anything to do with what was going on. A cynical Elland Road public had
been badly stung by their experiences with Peter Ridsdale and were only
too ready to look any gift horse in the mouth. John Boocock, co-chairman of the Leeds United Supporters' Trust: 'This
is typical of this group of people - they refuse to deal in an open and
transparent way. They did not tell us the full story about Geoffrey Richmond's
involvement so what else are they not telling us about? They have no reason
to hide anything - unless they are doing something untoward.' On the whole, however, Leeds fans had some reason to be cheerful, relieved
at the rescue of their club, and the apparent decimation of the liabilities. Supporters' club chairman Ray Fell in the Yorkshire Evening Post:
'It's been a nightmare couple of years but hopefully now the smiles will
start coming back to Elland Road. We've had trials and tribulations, and
there's been a lot of apprehension over the outcome of these negotiations.
But we realise this consortium presents the best option for Leeds, and
we're delighted someone's come along. We are not going to get Utopia overnight
but with the debts cleared, the money coming in can now work for Leeds.
The consortium have made the commitment and although there's a long road
ahead, I'm happy. I hope that this will help to settle the players, and
I'm hoping we can now avoid relegation. We do need to be cautious about
this because the problems are still there. Everyone was worried about
administration for a long time, and some spoke of liquidation, but with
the debts gone I hope we can now look forward.' Adulant Force consisted of five businessmen, who became the new board,
along with former United forward Peter Lorimer, responsible for advising
on football matters and liaising with the media. Lorimer's appointment
smacked of tokenism, to generate goodwill with the fans and allay concerns
about Petchey and Richmond. The rest of the board was made up as follows:
Krasner had this to say in his first press conference after the deal
was completed: 'I hope the supporters will judge, not just me but the whole board, by
what we do. There's been a lot of speculation that we are asset-strippers,
which I've denied on a number of occasions. We're here, we've saved the
club, we're off life support and now we're going to go and try to stay
in the Premiership 'When we got into this deal the debt was over £100m. As a result of
the transaction we have done the club is solvent again. We've sorted out
all the debt problems. Let's now go forward and get the club back on the
football pages. 'There has been rumour and counter rumour regarding the future of both
Elland Road and Thorp Arch and, once again, we can categorically reassure
fans that Leeds United will not be moving from Elland Road. As for Thorp
Arch, contracts were already in place to sell a tract of land at the training
ground which isn't currently used by the club. But there are no further
plans to sell the site or move the academy as it forms a crucial and integral
part of our business strategy and the club's future.' Administrators were appointed to handle the dissolution and winding up
of Leeds United plc and Leeds United Holdings Ltd, effectively meaning
that all the club's former shareholders would be left with nothing. Chief executive Trevor Birch was off shortly after the takeover was secured,
leaving for an ill fated period at Everton, while the club's connection
with Geoffrey Richmond did not last all that long, with Leeds supporters
breathing a sigh of relief as he departed. The fans rightly acclaimed Birch's achievement in keeping their beloved
club afloat and as he departed he spoke of how close the club had come
to ruin. 'There was a genuine prospect that, if the club had gone into administration,
liquidation would have followed. That would have meant the club folding
completely. There were a number of times when I couldn't see a solution
because of the enormity of the problems. 'My aim all along was to keep the squad intact because we had all seen
that selling players had only made the problems worse. Premiership survival
was always paramount and I would like to think that the team is going
into the last couple of months with a fighting chance. 'I had a great relationship with Eddie Gray. He hugely impressed me with
the way he conducted himself throughout a difficult time. With players
like Mark Viduka, I believe the team can climb out of the bottom three.
Mark has really set about galvanising the players in recent weeks. He
is the one walking around the training pitch saying, "Come on, we
aren't going down." 'I have been overwhelmed with the support and the thanks I have received.
Seeing people with my name on their shirts is a very humbling experience.
I tried my best to do the best job I could and hopefully I have left Leeds
United in better shape than I found them. 'I have to say I am very optimistic for the future of the club and really
do believe we will stay up this year. I will only feel my job at Elland
Road has been completed when we stay up. 'The supporters have been fantastic in the way they have stood by the
club The departure of Richmond was slightly less agreeable. A statement from Elland Road on 22 April said that Geoffrey Richmond
wanted to concentrate on his private life and was leaving for 'health
and personal reasons'. The truth was more intriguing - there was a rift
between Richmond and two of the club's directors. Morris and Levi were
unhappy that Richmond was raising his profile and increasing his duties,
despite investing no money in the takeover. A circular had been sent to
all 92 clubs in the top four divisions saying that Richmond would be negotiating
contracts and transfers on behalf of Leeds. He had also said that he would
be keen to become the club's new chief executive in the summer. It is believed that Morris, Levi and Krasner decided to sever all links.
Only his son, David Richmond, balked at the move. Krasner and Richmond declined to comment, but a club statement papered
over the cracks: 'Geoffrey played an important role as adviser during
the sale of Leeds United to the consortium and the board would like to
thank him for his untiring support during that period.' And so, the curtain fell on one of the most turbulent periods in the
history of Leeds United Football Club. The team was still in the middle
of a dire relegation struggle, there was the likelihood of a major clear
out of players in the summer and a grim foreboding about the future, but
a famous club had been pulled back from the brink of oblivion and would
live to fight another day. Part 1 A season from Hell - Part
2 What went wrong? - Part 4 End of an era
- Results and table |